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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this forum is “underappreciated criminal procedure 
cases.”  Given that topic, I have made an odd choice: Hoffa v. United 
States.1  Hoffa is an odd choice because it receives ample attention from 
courts, scholars, and students, having a prominent place in criminal 
procedure casebooks.2  Further, it is highlighted as a pivotal case in the 
historical development of Fourth Amendment doctrine in the recent 
well-known collection of essays on leading criminal procedure cases 
entitled Criminal Procedure Stories.3  Hoffa is an even odder choice 
because my fascination with it stems from one of the two reasons it is so 
famous—its seedling role in the growth of the “assumption of the risk” 
doctrine as the primary basis for drastically limiting the scope of Fourth 
 * Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law; J.D. 1981, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
 1. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 2. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF 
POLICE INVESTIGATION: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS 
205 (3d ed. 2002). 
 3. Tracey Maclin, Hoffa v. United States: Secret Agents in Private Spaces, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 181, 181–222 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). 




Amendment protections4 (the second reason for Hoffa’s fame is its more 
specific focus on the problem of undercover agents and informants5).  
Yet, I still consider Hoffa “underappreciated” because its core concept of 
assumption of the risk has not only migrated well beyond the area of 
informants, but has also overtly or covertly mutated into a highly 
individualistic notion of privacy as the lone individual’s successful 
struggle against all other human beings, social relationships, and the 
state.  This vision of privacy as being deserved only by those willing to 
fight for it to the point of severing all human connections renders the 
Fourth Amendment a weak guardian of liberty.  More importantly, it 
ignores the collective, political functions of the Fourth Amendment; it 
encourages an atomistic view of human nature inconsistent with the sort 
of defiant willingness to engage in collective political action required by 
virtuous citizens in republican governments; and it permits ready 
infiltration of dissenting groups by agents of the state.6  These are large 
claims that cannot be fully justified in so brief an essay.  Yet I hope to 
paint, albeit in broad brush strokes, a sufficiently vivid picture of the 
Court’s conception of privacy to unsettle the reader, convince her that 
my portrait is at least plausibly representative of reality, and whet her 
appetite for a more detailed argument to follow at a later date. 
Hoffa itself seems on its face a fairly innocuous and narrow decision.  
The case arose in the context of the “Test Fleet Trial,” in which James 
Hoffa (who was then President of the Teamsters Union) was being tried 
for violations of the Taft-Hartley Act.7  During the trial, a local Teamsters 
Union official, Edward Partin, met repeatedly with Hoffa in his hotel 
suite.  In Partin’s presence, Hoffa discussed bribing Test Fleet jury members.  
Partin reported these conversations to a federal agent, and Hoffa was 
arrested, charged, and convicted for endeavoring to bribe the Test Fleet 
jurors.  Hoffa appealed that conviction to the Supreme Court, arguing 
that his conversations with Partin should have been suppressed because 
Partin was a government informer.  Although Partin’s entry into Hoffa’s 
 4. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 109–10 (3d ed. 
2002). 
 5. See Maclin, supra note 3, at 214–20. 
 6. See infra Part II; cf. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868 (2006) [hereinafter 
TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT] (historical background to these 
claims); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 112 (2007) (infiltration); Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: 
Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2002) (atomism); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the 
Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2003) [hereinafter Taslitz, Racial Auditors] (political function). 
 7. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294, 296 (1966). 
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room was consensual, Hoffa contended that Partin’s failure to disclose 
his role as a government informer vitiated Hoffa’s consent and turned 
the interactions into an illegal search for verbal evidence.  The Supreme 
Court disagreed: 
 In the present case, however, it is evident that no interest legitimately 
protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved.  It is obvious that the petitioner 
was not relying on the security of his hotel suite when he made the 
incriminating statements to Partin or in Partin’s presence.  Partin did not enter 
the suite by force or by stealth.  He was not a surreptitious eavesdropper.  Partin 
was in the suite by invitation, and every conversation which he heard was either 
directed to him or knowingly carried on in his presence.  The petitioner, in a 
word, was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was relying upon his 
misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing. . . . 
 Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the 
Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to 
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.8
The Court’s conclusion, upholding the undercover agent’s actions, 
seems intuitively right, for without undercover activity much serious 
crime would go undetected or unprevented.9  But the Court did much 
more than hold that on the facts the search was reasonable—the Fourth 
Amendment demanding such reasonableness for all searches and 
seizures.10  Rather, the Court held that there was no search in the first 
place, thus there was no search for the Fourth Amendment to protect.  
Although Hoffa briefly preceded the Court’s adoption of the Katz v. 
United States test, defining searches as invasions of “reasonable expectations 
of privacy,”11 Hoffa’s logic survived and has been incorporated into the 
 8. Id. at 302 (footnote omitted). 
 9. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).  There, the Court 
rejected the argument that an undercover drug purchase in the defendant’s home violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. at 211.  Where the home was converted into a 
“commercial center” in which outsiders were invited in for illegal business, it had no 
greater sanctity than a store, garage, or street.  Id.  The Court emphasized the practical 
implications of its holding: 
Were we to hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally 
prohibited, we would come near to a rule that the use of undercover agents in 
any manner is virtually unconstitutional per se.  Such a rule would, for 
example, severely hamper the Government in ferreting out those organized 
criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings with victims who 
either cannot or do not protest.  A prime example is provided by the narcotics 
traffic. 
Id. at 210 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 11. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 




modern understanding of the Katz test for what conduct constitutes a 
“search.”  Thus, using “Katzian” terminology, Hoffa must today be understood 
as holding, or at least as laying the foundation for the currently dominant 
idea, that there is no reasonable privacy expectation against another’s 
turning on the discloser of information.12
This Hoffian idea of “misplaced confidence” in confiding in others 
has come to be called by commentators and the Court itself “assumption 
of the risk.”13  Yet the Court does not give this term the meaning it 
ordinarily receives in tort and criminal law: proceeding in the face of a 
risk of which you are consciously aware.14  There was no evidence in 
Hoffa that he had any awareness of the risk that Partin worked for the 
government or would turn on Hoffa.  Moreover, the Court has 
unquestionably applied the assumption of risk idea in post-Hoffa cases 
to situations where conscious awareness of a risk of lost privacy was not 
only lacking, but where most Americans would agree it was lacking.15  
While “assumption of risk” under the Fourth Amendment thus occurs 
when the Court believes someone should have been aware of such a 
risk, empirical evidence suggests the Court’s notion of what risks we 
must fairly assume is sometimes wildly out of line with ordinary 
citizens’ views on that subject.16
The migration of the assumption of risk idea from the undercover 
agent context to most other Fourth Amendment contexts logically 
should—and indeed does—have radical implications.17  When we leave 
the home, we “risk” being seen or heard by observers, as we do when we 
confide in friends or lovers, engage in financial transactions, make 
telephone calls, use the internet, drive, shop, eat out, visit museums, or 
accept social invitations—in short, when we engage in all of life’s 
ordinary occupations.18  With a few limited exceptions, as I and others 
 12. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 107–43 (2d ed. 2003) (analyzing the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test). 
 13. Id. at 116–20. 
 14. Id. at 117. 
 15. Id.; see also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look 
at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) 
(empirically comparing Court’s assessments of reasonable privacy expectations with 
those held by most Americans, often finding a significant divergence between the two). 
 16. TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 12, at 117; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 
15, at 737–42. 
 17. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First 
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 
(2002) (exploring these implications). 
 18. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 12, at 107–43 (showing how the Court has 
limited citizens’ expectations of privacy in a variety of life’s normal occurrences); infra 
text accompanying notes 21–30. 
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have demonstrated elsewhere, these logical implications of Hoffa’s 
reasoning uncabined have been realized.19  Further growth spurts may 
also lie in Hoffa’s doctrinal future. 
The title of this short essay is “Privacy as Struggle,” a title meant in 
part to capture the Court’s requirement of superhuman individual efforts 
to attain secrecy, that is, totally veiling one’s activities from the state’s 
prying eyes as an essential prerequisite to the existence of privacy, all 
too often at the expense of human relationships, interpersonal trust, and 
political voice.  I want, therefore, to paint an apocalyptic vision of the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence, as the reader will no 
doubt have noticed I have already done in connection with my reading of 
Hoffa.  I want to do so not because I truly believe that the end of civil 
liberties is coming, but rather because I believe that the apocalyptic 
attitude can sharpen our understanding of the consequences of the Court’s 
conception of privacy.  Merely screaming, “The sky is falling! The sky is 
falling!” is sometimes part of what helps to keep it up in heaven, to stop 
a small shift away from sound civil liberties ideals from snowballing 
into a more rapid descent down the slippery slope into civil liberties 
Armageddon.20
II.  V FOR VENDETTA 
The best place to turn for apocalyptic imagery is, of course, science 
fiction films.  The most recent such film relevant to my essay is V for 
Vendetta.21  Vendetta takes place in a near-future England in which fear 
of terrorism has led to the election of an oppressive government that puts 
a premium on surveilling its citizenry.  The governmental departments 
charged with coordinating surveillance are named by their function as 
body parts: the “Eye” to watch citizens through both visible cameras on 
 19. See Taslitz, supra note 17, at 133–50. 
 20. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the Fourth Amendment: 
Of Terrorism, Slippery Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195 
(2005) (exploring how fear for the future can lead to dangerous civil liberties slippery 
slopes in the Fourth Amendment area and recommending an energized, albeit perhaps 
paranoiac, dissent as an important counterweight); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of 
the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003) (examining the causes of slippery 
slopes and the means for countering them). 
 21. My recounting of the Vendetta story is based on my repeated viewing of the V 
for Vendetta two-disk DVD of a film by the same name starring Natalie Portman and 
Hugo Weaving.  V FOR VENDETTA (Warner Bros. 2006).  That film is in turn based on 
the Vertigo/DC Comics novel.  ALAN MOORE ET AL., V FOR VENDETTA (2005). 




public streets and hidden ones in private residences; the “Ear” to listen to 
telephone and other electronic voice communications; and the “Finger 
Men” to reach out and grab the seditious and the different whose presence 
the Eye and Ear have detected. 
V is a superhuman figure, an escaped concentration camp survivor 
transformed by his captors’ brutal scientific experiments.  Masked with 
the face of Guy Fawkes, the failed bomber of Parliament in an earlier 
century who sought to bring down what he saw as an overweening 
government, V wages an initially one-man campaign to bring down the 
modern totalitarian regime.22  To do so, V must, of course, somehow 
avoid the surveillance of the Eye and Ear and the brutality of the Finger 
Men.  He therefore constructs a well-shielded Shadow Gallery as his 
home—an underground lair built in the forgotten core of the city’s long-
abandoned subway system, the “tube” to you Anglophiles out there.  His 
few and rare guests—a woman named “Evey” being the only one of 
which the audience is ever aware—must be blindfolded and rendered 
unconscious to protect his location.  Even then, he is reluctant to release 
Evey, for he fears that even a description of the color of the stone in his 
lair will be sufficient for the Finger Men to identify him.  Yet, at the 
same time, his isolation—V is cut off from all human contact other than 
Evey—allows him to explain his seditious ideas to Evey without fear, 
and to bring her to see the importance of liberation. 
One of V’s primary tools of rebellion is his eventual blinding of the 
Eye and deafening of the Ear by sabotage.  The state’s blindness and 
deafness cannot last long, but V does not need much time, for the 
people, once freed from surveillance, arise in their own struggle of a 
different sort from that of V: the struggle of a group to regain political 
autonomy for itself and for its individual members. 
To be sure, none of us has to build hidden underground lairs to 
achieve privacy.  Yet the Court’s dominant notion of privacy centers on 
the idea of “assumption of risk,” meaning that if you want to protect 
yourself against state surveillance, you must make every effort to protect 
yourself against private surveillance, and every person you trust to know 
a part of your life creates a risk of revelation that you must accept.23  If 
your friend turns out to be an undercover agent, you pay for your trust in 
him when he turns state’s evidence against you.24  If you deposit your 
 22. See generally ANTONIA FRASER, FAITH AND TREASON: THE STORY OF THE 
GUNPOWDER PLOT (1996) (providing background on Guy Fawkes’s role in British history 
and memory); JAMES SHARPE, REMEMBER, REMEMBER: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GUY 
FAWKES DAY (2005) (same). 
 23. See Taslitz, supra note 17, at 134–41. 
 24. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer 
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funds in a bank, “assuming the risk,” it too may turn on you, and you 
lose any constitutional ground for barring the state from learning 
whatever it wishes to know about your finances.25  If you walk on the 
street, where other people can see and hear you, you can and increasingly 
are subject to camera surveillance by the state.  Much like Vendetta, you 
took a chance with your privacy just by leaving home.26
Indeed, it is the home that seems to be the one place where the Court 
claims to be, and often is, granting privacy without requiring extraordinary 
efforts to see that what is said and done in the home stays in the home.27  
Still, you had better keep your blinds completely shuttered, or peeping 
Toms and peeping police may come to snoop.28  And if the police want 
to use thermal imaging or other modern technologies to monitor what 
you do in your home, you do have privacy protection there, but only if 
the technologies are not yet in widespread use.29  Should there be rapid 
or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the 
condition of human society.  It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we 
speak.”) (approvingly quoted by the majority in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 
303 (1966)). 
 25. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that there is 
no legitimate “expectation of privacy” in the contents of checks and deposit slips since 
they are negotiable instruments and not confidential communications, nor in financial 
statements because they, like the checks and deposit slips, “contain only information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course 
of business.”). 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (holding that 
an electronic device used to track a moving motor vehicle, where the public generally 
could observe that vehicle, did not invade any reasonable expectation of privacy); Martin 
Marcus & Christopher Slobogin, ABA Sets Standards for Electronic and Physical 
Surveillance, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2003, at 5 (analyzing implications of Court’s electronic 
surveillance jurisprudence); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance 
of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002) (examining 
specifically this jurisprudence’s implications for video surveillance on public streets). 
 27. See Taslitz, supra note 17, at 144–45; D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal 
Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255 (2006) (exploring legal privileging of the home, 
including in the Fourth Amendment context). 
 28. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (holding that a visitor to a 
home engaged in a drug transaction observed by an officer peeping through window 
blinds had no reasonable expectation of privacy against such observation). 
 29. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that officers using 
a thermal imaging device to detect marijuana growing heat lamps in a home engaged in a 
Fourth Amendment search but only because the technology involved was “not in general 
public use”). 




social diffusion of technology, your home may no longer be your castle, 
however much that old adage may continue to be used.30
In the recent case of Georgia v. Randolph,31 the Court likewise held 
that police do not have consent to enter a home when one resident, a 
wife, says yes, but the other resident, her husband, says no, a holding 
seemingly giving strong privacy protection to the home.  Still, Justice 
Alito took no part in this decision, three other Justices dissented, and the 
author of one of the dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Roberts, probably 
more accurately read the Court’s prior precedents when he described 
them as having “clearly mapped out” this rule: “If an individual shares 
information, papers, or places with another, he assumes the risk that the 
other person will in turn share access to that information or those papers 
or places with the government.”32  Indeed, Roberts wrote: “Even in our 
most private relationships, our observable actions and possessions are 
private at the discretion of those around us.”33  Thus, Roberts had this 
advice for the unwary spouse: 
   To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a 
consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an 
area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a 
locked suitcase under a bed.34
So much for trust in the marital relationship.  Not once did Roberts 
address the consequences of his decision as being the complete absence 
of prior judicial review or authorization for the state’s entry into the 
home because, in his vision, the wife’s consent effectively constituted a 
waiver of the husband’s privacy rights, leaving him with no Fourth 
Amendment protection at all.35  Likewise, Roberts likely misread the 
majority’s rule, which permits warrantless entry where there is still some 
individualized suspicion—reasonable suspicion—such as when interspousal 
domestic violence is suspected.36  Again, Roberts’s rule does away with 
even this traditional limitation on police power, a limitation that does not 
handicap the police in doing their jobs.37
The individualistic emphasis of the Court’s concept of privacy also 
means that group privacy—which can have social functions somewhat 
 30. See Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: 
Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1393 (2002) (exploring Kyllo’s implications). 
 31. 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006). 
 32. Id. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 1534. 
 34. Id. at 1535. 
 35. See id. at 1531–37. 
 36. See id. at 1525–26 (majority opinion) (addressing the crime victim scenario). 
 37. Id. (noting majority’s rule will not interfere with the police’s protection of 
abused spouses). 
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different from the privacy accorded to individuals38—is for all practical 
purposes outside the Fourth Amendment’s protection.39  Groups require 
a shielding from the judging eyes of the broader society or the intimidating 
stare of the state for their coherence and for their effectiveness in serving 
their particular social function.40  Group privacy encourages the free 
exchange of ideas among group members, a process that can stiffen their 
resolve to stand fast in favor of their dissenting views against the 
enormous majority pressures toward social conformity.41  This function 
of group privacy has obvious First Amendment implications,42 and 
courts often do address certain matters that could be viewed as group 
privacy issues as, instead, simple free speech issues.43  But ignoring the 
 38. See TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 190 
(summarizing the social functions of group privacy). 
 39. See id. at 260.  An individualistic approach to privacy ignores the experience 
that informed search and seizure understandings in 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states, was ratified: 
A purely individualistic conception of privacy that fails to honor separately the 
privacy of families and of community, of social and political groups[, as the 
Court’s does], forgets the experience of slaves living under a system in which 
they struggled to preserve or achieve these things in the face of overwhelming 
onslaught. 
Id. 
 40. See id. at 190. 
 41. Id.  Further: 
[T]he opportunity for groups to gather in homes, civic centers, schools, and 
churches—all the time substantially insulated from outsiders’ eyes—may be 
necessary to promote the free exchange of ideas that define a democracy.  Such 
an exchange can also encourage group solidarity, enhancing part of each 
individual’s sense of self while emboldening group members eventually to 
express their views in a broader public forum. 
Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 17, at 158–65 (explaining how privacy for gays to 
congregate is essential to developing personal relationships and group identification, 
which is central to many gay individuals’ identity and important for fostering a 
democratic society); Solove, supra note 6, at 138–51 (collecting cases that address 
various First Amendment rights in the group context). 
 43. See, e.g., Menotti v. Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (viewing police 
implementation of city emergency order prohibiting protestors’ access to portions of 
downtown during an international trade conference as primarily a First Amendment free 
speech question, though analyzing a specific instance of police taking a protestor’s sign 
as a Fourth Amendment seizure question); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 475 F. Supp. 
2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (analyzing constitutional claims of inappropriate NYPD surveillance 
and intelligence-gathering activities directed at protestors, including videotaping public 
gatherings and preserving the tapes, as First Amendment free speech questions), vacated, 
No. 71 Civ. 2203(CSH), 2007 WL 1711775 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007) (vacating portions 
of the earlier order but still analyzing the constitutional issues under the First Amendment). 




close connection between Fourth Amendment privacy and First Amendment 
free speech issues undervalues both constitutional protections.44  It was, 
for example, the willingness of New York courts under that state’s 
constitution to recognize broad privacy rights in even public restrooms 
and gay bars that significantly contributed to the rise of the gay rights 
movement in New York and nationally, for gay men and women could 
come out of the closet to voice their views without risking targeted 
police investigations and arrests for alleged consensual sex crimes.45  
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court readily rejected the argument 
that the Fourth Amendment presumptively requires using a subpoena 
rather than a search warrant to obtain newspaper records of journalistic 
investigations.46  A subpoena would allow media outlets to select the 
relevant documents themselves rather than permitting police rummaging 
through relevant and irrelevant items.47  A subpoena also gives a 
newspaper time to file a motion to quash it, perhaps on First Amendment 
grounds, perhaps preventing a constitutional violation in the first place 
rather than seeking an after-the-fact remedy for damage done.48  The 
Supreme Court was unmoved by such considerations,49 and it took the 
Privacy Protection Act of 1980 to correct this mistake.50  More recently, 
the New York Police Department has been accused of using mass arrest 
and surveillance tactics at the Republican National Convention, thereby 
limiting the size, scope, and movements of the public protests, chilling 
free speech, and “raising troubling questions about whether the Department 
was targeting protesters for arrest.”51
 44. See TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 12 
(making a similar point and summarizing some of the historical support). 
 45. Taslitz, supra note 17, at 160–61. 
 46. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978). 
 47. See Brief for Respondents at 20 n.8, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 
(1978) (Nos. 76-1484, 76-1600), 1977 WL 189744. 
 48. See id. at 8. 
 49. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 554–68.  For background on the legal requirements for, 
and tactical advantages and disadvantages of, subpoenas, see MARC L. MILLER & 
RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES (2d ed. 2003) and TASLITZ & PARIS, supra 
note 12, at 142, 741, 749. 
 50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2000) (limiting seizure of media work product during 
the course of an investigation). 
 51. See CHRISTOPHER DUNN ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RIGHTS AND 
WRONGS AT THE RNC: A SPECIAL REPORT ABOUT POLICE AND PROTEST AT THE 
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION 14–36, 43–45 (2005), available at http://www. 
nyclu.org/pdfs/rnc_report_083005.pdf.  See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREEDOM 
UNDER FIRE: DISSENT IN POST-9/11 AMERICA (2003), available at http://aclu.org 
FilesPDFs/dissent_report.pdf (commenting on police efforts to suppress dissent in cities 
throughout America).  The New York Times editorial page recently made these trenchant 
comments about the NYPD’s tactics:  
  Police Commissioner Ray Kelly seemed to cast an awfully wide and 
indiscriminate net in seeking out potential troublemakers.  For more than a 
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Groups can also matter less for overtly political reasons than for 
reasons of human flourishing.52  Constitutional scholar Doriane Lambelet 
Coleman has particularly emphasized the impact on family privacy of 
unjustified child abuse investigations.  As Coleman notes, in most 
jurisdictions, upon a report of suspicion of child abuse—reports generally 
inadequate to establish even particularized reasonable suspicion as 
defined in the Terry v. Ohio line of cases:53
[T]he state typically seeks to enter into and examine the family home and to 
seize and separate the children from their parents or from the school setting in 
which their parents have placed them so that they can be interviewed and 
examined, either by CPS, the police, or medical personnel designated by these 
officials.  Generally, state officials are authorized to exercise extraordinarily 
unfettered discretion when they engage in these intrusions.  [Yet approximately] 70 
percent of the time no abuse or neglect is found by the conclusion of the 
investigations.54
year before the convention, members of a police spy unit headed by a former 
official of the Central Intelligence Agency infiltrated a wide range of groups.  
As Jim Dwyer has reported in The Times, many of the targets—including 
environmental and church groups and even a satirical troupe called Billionaires 
for Bush—posed no danger or credible threat. . . . 
  . . . . 
  Along with Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s denial of permits for protests on 
Central Park’s Great Lawn, the police action helped to all but eliminate dissent 
from New York City during the Republican delegates’ visit.  If that was the 
goal, then mission accomplished.  And civil rights denied. 
Editorial, Secrets of the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A18. 
 52. See TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 277 
(explaining the importance of family relationships, and how social services employees 
are allowed to search homes and seize children with nothing more than a hunch of child 
abuse). 
 53. For an explanation of the Terry v. Ohio standard, see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000): 
In Terry, we held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, 
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.  While “reasonable suspicion” is a less 
demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably 
less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at 
least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.  The officer 
must be able to articulate more than an “inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or ‘hunch’” of criminal activity. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 54. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The 
Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 413, 441 (2005); see Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 
or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987) (defending a broad notion of 
Fourth Amendment privacy that protects interpersonal relationships). 




Coleman goes on to document a significant number of cases in which 
previously happy and healthy families became dysfunctional because of 
these unjustified searches.55  It was not simply the individual harm done 
to the psyches of children or parents56 but the resulting harm to family 
dynamics that amplified the harm to all.57  Yet few, if any, courts recognize 
these matters as implicating the Fourth Amendment.58  Coleman argues 
that variants of the traditional individualized suspicion and warrant 
requirements can better balance the need to ferret out child abuse than 
does the current approach of almost unfettered state discretion.59
The Supreme Court’s focus on an individual privacy of personal 
struggle also makes it easy for privacy incursions to be balanced away 
by countervailing state needs.  After all, if the harm the state inflicts is to 
but one person while the gains the state makes are portrayed as to all of 
society, it would intuitively seem to be the rare case where the state 
should lose.60  Indeed, state interests prevail far more than individual 
ones in a host of situations: from weak protections against automobile 
searches; to expansion of the requirement of mere “reasonable suspicion” as 
an alternative to, and lesser justification for, searches than is probable 
cause; to a wide array of suspicionless, warrantless purportedly administrative 
searches.61  This approach thoroughly ignores the collective political 
functions of the Fourth Amendment in preventing group and individual 
humiliation by the state and in regulating state violence.62  Such collective 
political functions are found in a close examination of the riots, protests, 
and philosophical defenses of the concepts underlying what became the 
Amendment during the long colonial struggle with England.63  But they 
are also found in the history of search and seizure practices during 
slavery and Reconstruction—a history leading up to the eventual 
 55. Coleman, supra note 54, at 447–58. 
 56. Id. at 514–19. 
 57. See id. at 441–58. 
 58. See id. at 415–16. 
 59. Id. at 522–40. 
 60. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 91–92 (2003) (supporting a similar point that the Court frequently 
finds state concerns to be weighty while citizenry concerns slight). 
 61. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 12, at 332–412 (summarizing case law); 
Margaret Paris & Andrew E. Taslitz, Catering to the Constable: The Court’s Latest 
Fourth Amendment Cases Give the Nod to the Police, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2004, at 5, 7 
(analyzing the trend of recent cases). 
 62. See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 6, at 264–98 (examining the Fourth 
Amendment’s connection to the “political emotions” that promote civil liberties change 
and to “political honor” as a component of the character of a vigilant and virtuous 
republican people); Taslitz, supra note 60 (examining the roles of group and individual 
humiliation and respect in the Fourth Amendment’s regulation of political violence). 
 63. See generally TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra 
note 6, at 17–67 (providing a historical and philosophical analysis of this issue). 
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incorporation of the Fourth Amendment against the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment of 1868.64  Yet the Court’s individualistic emphasis 
leads it to read the relevant history with a selective eye, downplaying the 
collective political aspects of the history of the original Fourth Amendment 
of 1791, and entirely ignoring the nineteenth-century history of search and 
seizure abuses that logically should inform the meaning of the modern 
Fourth Amendment.65
Correspondingly, a fuller examination of the relevant history reveals 
that the Fourth Amendment was rooted in a social contract philosophy in 
which one function of the state was to maintain social order among the 
People by the use of violence, while the People were to regulate the 
state’s violence to prevent it from becoming but a larger replacement for 
private oppression.66  Restated, the Amendment assumes that public 
safety and vigorous privacy protections are both feasible and desirable.  
The tradeoff between security and liberty is thus seen as false; both can 
be achieved.67  But that is an approach that seems consistent with a least 
restrictive alternatives strict scrutiny analysis—one requiring state 
creativity to craft the least intrusive means for protecting public safety.68  
Yet, with precious little explanation, the Court has expressly rejected 
such an analysis despite routinely subjecting other fundamental rights to 
the rigors of strict scrutiny.69
Finally, and perhaps ironically, though the Court articulates a weak 
concept of privacy, it articulates virtually no theories of property and 
free movement—the two other sorts of interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment but relegated to secondary status.70  As to the latter of these 
two interests—locomotion—Professor Tracey Maclin wrote about its 
secondary status for the first time over a decade ago.71  Yet, sadly the 
 64. See generally id. at 95–257 (recounting the relevant antebellum and 
Reconstruction history). 
 65. Id. at 11–14. 
 66. Id. at 3–4. 
 67. See id. at 261–62. 
 68. See id. at 82–83, 261–62. 
 69. See MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCTRINE 70, 84 (2001). 
 70. See TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 6, at 
259–60. 
 71. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth 
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1259 (1990) (arguing that the 
Court has “placed [the right to move freely] at risk by undermining its central constitutional 
underpinnings through restrictive interpretation of the [F]ourth [A]mendment”). 




situation has only gotten worse since.  As one brief example, Terry stops 
are permitted not merely on a lower quantity but also a lower quality of 
evidence.72  Moreover, as Professor David Harris has ably documented, 
despite the Court’s asserted commitment to individualized suspicion, 
lower courts have increasingly allowed reliance on generalizations and 
stereotypes to justify stops.73  The Supreme Court and the lower courts 
often wax rhapsodic about privacy, but rarely, if ever, do they explicate 
the social value of locomotion.74  Here too, they could learn some 
lessons from history—a history we do not here have the time to review.75
III.  CONCLUSION 
For me, the lessons that the courts have drawn from Hoffa have had 
importance well beyond electronic surveillance, as I have attempted to 
explain.  Yet, the implications of this broadly important concept of 
privacy as personal struggle in the context of technological surveillance 
are equally troubling.  If privacy inheres in individuals alone, apart from 
human interrelationships or the social reality of groups; if privacy further 
thus serves only narrow, parochial interests rather than broader collective 
and individual ones; and, if privacy invasions therefore need not be 
routinely monitored by agencies other than the Executive Branch, such 
as by the judiciary or more directly by the People, then privacy interests 
must certainly readily give way in the face of seemingly grave and 
potentially imminent threats to public safety like those posed by terrorism.76  
Similarly, if privacy is accorded a relatively low ranking in the hierarchy 
of fundamental rights, then government need not be creative and energetic 
in seeking ways to achieve both privacy and security.  The easiest, most 
blunt, most direct assaults on privacy thus become acceptable means to 
achieve public safety.77  The logic of such an approach leads to programs 
like the warrantless, suspicionless, secret electronic NSA surveillance 
program of international phone calls that recently made its way into the 
 72. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 12, 
at 309–16. 
 73. David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme 
Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
975, 987–88 (1998); David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing 
the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 
MISS. L.J. 423, 434–35 (2003). 
 74. Maclin, supra note 71, at 1260. 
 75. See generally TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra 
note 6, at 106–86 (providing a history of mobility during the mid-1800s). 
 76. See Taslitz, supra note 20, at 232–43; supra text accompanying notes 1–19. 
 77. See Taslitz, supra note 20, at 232–34, 239–42. 
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newspapers.78  Indeed, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, during an 
appearance just last year before the House Judiciary Committee, 
suggested that the extension of the NSA surveillance program to 
domestic phone conversations could not be ruled out.79  Gonzales would 
not even confirm or deny the existence of a current, ongoing NSA 
domestic telephone surveillance program, one that largely trusts the 
Executive to police itself.  This is something that surely would have 
surprised the Framers, and that Representative Adam Schiff of California 
described as a “very disturbing” prospect, “represent[ing] a wholly 
unprecedented assertion of executive power.”80
Likewise, if privacy is so narrowly defined by the Court, as it 
currently is, that it renders who is doing the watching, how, and for what 
purposes irrelevant, and that it declares privacy in public to be incoherent, 
then much technological surveillance can seemingly legitimately go 
thoroughly unregulated, encouraging its expansion.81  The rapid spread 
of closed-circuit television (CCTV) on many street corners in many US 
cities—a technology not proven to be particularly effective in reducing 
either crime or terrorism—is a perfect example.82  The ABA, under Chris 
Slobogin’s leadership, has recommended continuing citizen oversight of 
CCTV and aggressive policies to limit when and how photos are taken, 
 78. James Riesen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.  See generally Brief for Amici Curiae Center for 
National Security Studies & The Constitution Project at 3–5, Am. Civil Liberties Union 
v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 467 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 06-2095, 06-2140) (providing 
background on the NSA program); AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 302, at 2–16 (2006), 
http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/memos/aba_house302-0206.pdf (providing an in-depth 
analysis of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the NSA program’s 
constitutionality); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, STATEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT’S LIBERTY AND SECURITY INITIATIVE (2006), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/ 
Members_NSA_Surveillance_Statement.pdf (expressing opposition to the NSA program). 
 79. Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Suggests Legal Basis for Domestic Eavesdropping, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A23. 
 80. Id.  Given the bad publicity about the NSA warrantless surveillance program, it 
has, according to the Administration, recently been dropped, and replaced by a special 
FISA Court program whose details, as of the date of this writing, remain secret.  Id.  Yet, 
just as this essay went to press, Congress passed a statute authorizing a variant of the 
original warrantless surveillance program, albeit an authority that lapses after 180 days if 
the statute is not reenacted.  See James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen Reach for 
Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A1. 
 81. See Taslitz, supra note 17, at 141–46. 
 82. Id. at 125–27, 126 n.10. 




how long they are preserved, and for what purposes they are used.83  
These recommendations are but one example of how security and liberty 
can both be served by envisioning privacy as addressing collective, 
political problems requiring collective, political solutions.  But if these 
proposals are adopted legislatively or by executive action, it will not be 
because of, but rather in spite of, the Court’s cramped notion of Fourth 
Amendment privacy. 
We do not live in V for Vendetta’s totalitarian world of the all-
knowing Eye and Ear.  But current constitutional privacy concepts nod 
enough in that direction to make that movie metaphor resonate and make 





 83. See generally id. at 182–87 (discussing the ABA standard, its implications, and 
shortcomings). 
